Iranian government budget on military over the last decade has been higher than the average of the world. The current increasing international sanctions aim to reduce the military capabilities and capacities of the Iranian government. In this study, we analyze the response of the Iranian economy to shocks in its military budget from 1959-2007, using Impulse Response Functions (IRF) and Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDA) techniques. The Granger causality results show that there is unidirectional causality from military spending to the economic growth. The response of income growth to increasing shocks in the military budget is positive and statistically significant. JEL classification: C22, H56, H50
Introduction
In the past decade, the Iranian government has allocated a significant amount of budget to the military and security fields. According to the World Bank (2011), in 2000s, on average, Iran's military expenditures as a share of total expenditures amount to 16% which was higher than the average of this budget in Middle East and North Africa (13%), OECD countries (10%), Latin America (7%) and European Union (5%). Iran has also the highest number of military personnel in the Persian Gulf region. It is more than double the combined number of military personnel in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). More specifically, the number of Iran military personnel is more than the 3 times of the Saudi Arabia and more than 10 times of the UAE, 35 times of the Kuwait and 37 times of Bahrain. In 2007, Iran was the 15 th top country in the world in a term of absolute value of military spending in PPP (purchasing power party and constant prices) (Askari et al., 2009, pp. 25 and 72) .
It is interesting to consider the trend of allocation budget into different groups of spending within the Iranian government after war with Iraq. Since the country began reconstruction of economy, one may expect that the government pay more attention to human capital and social issues. However, the official statistics show a different picture. The Iranian National Accounts show a significant increase in the share of military spending in total government spending (in constant prices) since the end of the war with Iraq. While this share was 16% in 1993, it has reached to 52% in 2006 (CBI, 2011) . The share of education spending at the same period shows a reduction from 27% to 15%. The same pattern can be observed for the case of spending on health and social affairs. Indeed, the country has gone to more militarization and strengthening of military linkages to the national economy. Figure 1 shows the relative size of military budget in the Iranian government for the last available year in the National Accounts (2007) . While the half of government spending allocated to the military fields, the health section received only 3% of the budget. The military industry of Iran has been a source of 3/27 income and employment as well. The share of armed force personnel in total labor force of Iran in 2008 was about 2%, while the same figure of the average country in the world and low & middle income group was 0.87% and 0.83%, respectively. The effects of military spending on the supply side of the economy can be contradicting. On one side, the scare economic resources which are spent in the military fields could be invested in the other more productive fields, reducing the inefficiencies and waste. On the other side, if there are technological spill overs from military sector to other parts of the economy, then a boosting military industry can foster economic growth and increase of human capital (Malizard, 2010 and Ram, 1993) . On demand side, increasing government spending on military affairs may increase new employment and disposable income of households as is discussed in the Keynesian theory. Farzanegan, 2011) can also lead to economic stagnation and additional problems in local economy of Iran.
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The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on the role of military forces in the post-revolution Iranian economy. Section 3 presents a brief review of literature on the growth-military spending nexus. Section 4 presents the data and empirical method. Section 5 explains the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2-Background
In this section, we present some background information on the economic activities of the key gas treatment projects in South Pars in July 2010. 7 The IRGC has also established its own banks such as Ansar Bank 8 and Mehr Finance and Credit Institution. 9 The IRGC is rapidly expanding its influence on different aspects of the formal and informal Iranian economy. 10
Review of literature: military spending and economic growth
There are two different branches in the literature on the effects of military spending on economic growth. Some argues for positive nexus between military spending and growth, the others refer to negative link.
There are some studies which argue in support of the positive growth effects of military spending. In his seminal works, Benoit (1973 Benoit ( , 1978 show that spending on military industry 
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using co-integration and causality tests for the period 1961-2000. In most cases they find a positive causality from economic growth to military spending and not vice versa. They conclude that most countries in the EU decide how much to spend on their military spending by considering their economic status. Dunne et al. (2001) show that there is some weak evidence on positive effect of changing military burden on growth for Greece. In a causality analysis for 62 developing countries, Dakurah et al. (2000) show that in 23 countries there is a unidirectional causality from military spending to economic growth or vice versa and a bidirectional causality in 7 countries. Studying the Arab-Israel conflict, Abu-qarn (2010) The second group of studies point out the negative growth effects of military spending through different channels such as lower saving rates and investment, reduction of other productive spending (health and education), higher budget deficit, higher debt, increase of corruption, higher tax rates and lower productivity of private sector and lower capital formation and resource extraction (see, for example, Deger 1986; Chan 1988; Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; Mintz and Huang, 1990; Scheetz, 1991; Asseery, 1996; Dunne and Vougas, 1999; Gupta et al., 2001; and Dunne et al., 2002) . Chowdhury (1991) examines the Granger causality between military spending and economic growth for the 55 developing countries. He concludes that the relationship between these two 9/27 variables cannot be generalized across countries and may vary from one country to another. Dunne et al. (2005) provide a critical review of the literature on military spending-economic growth nexus. Although there are some studies which investigate a sample of MENA countries (see Askari et al., 2009 and Yildirim et al., 2005 for a survey of related works), however, there has been less attention to the case study of Iran. We fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the military spending-economic growth nexus in Iran.
Data and methodology

Data
To examine the dynamic effects of military spending shocks on the Iranian economic growth and vice versa, we made use of two variables: ). Furthermore, we take the effects of the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) into account by using a dummy as exogenous variable.
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Methodology
The most appropriate approach to investigate the dynamic interconnections between economic growth and military spending is the unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model and applied tools such as Impulse Response Functions (IRF) and Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDA). Stock and Watson (2001) suggest that "since VARs involve current and lagged values of multiple time series, they capture comovements that cannot be detected in univariate or bivariate models". In a VAR model developed by Sims (1980) , changes in a specific variable such as economic growth are explained by its own lags and the past information of other variable in the system. One of the main advantages of this methodology is that it assumes that both growth and military spending are endogenous variables. This assumption is plausible in our context as well. Increasing the share of military spending affects growth through different channels: it may increase growth through positive externalities, technological spillover and expansion of aggregate demand. It may also decrease growth by channelizing the scare economic and human resources from productive activities to rent seeking and corruption which is shown to be correlated with higher levels of military spending (Gupta et al., 2001) . 13 Additionally, income growth can also affect the allocation of government budget and the share of military spending. Higher income growth increases the domestic stability and more resources are available for investing in quality of institutions.
This positive development may lead to lower demand for investing in weapon and other military capacities. Therefore, we can see the feedback effects from economic growth to the size of military budget. The VAR model is an appropriate approach to accommodate the endogeneity problem in our context. We do three different investigations. First, we examine the Granger causality between economic growth and military spending. We are interested to know that whether the predictions of income growth based on knowledge of past values of 13 A recent annual of the SIPRI mentions: "Resource revenues are often managed non-transparently and without proper accountability, which may lead to large off-budget military spending and corrupt arms purchases" (SIPRI, 2010).
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military spending and income growth is better than the predictions of growth based only on the past values of growth and vice versa for the predictions of military spending. Second through the IRF techniques we would like to measure the size, duration and statistical significance of responses of economic growth (military spending) to shocks in military spending (economic growth). Third, we also use the VDA tool. VDA is slightly different from IRF. VDAs examine the relative importance of military spending shocks in the volatility of economic growth in the system. A shock to the military spending budget will of course directly affect the variable itself, but it will also transfer to other variables in the VAR system such as income growth. VDA measures the share of the movements in a respected variable (e.g. military expenditures) that are due to their own shocks and at the same time shocks to other variable (e.g. income growth).
IRF and VDA analyses are based on the estimation of the following unrestricted VAR model with the order of p:
where y t is a vector of endogenous variables, X t is a vector of exogenous variables which their values are determined outside of the VAR system (e.g. there are not equations in the VAR system with an exogenous dependent variable), A i and B are coefficient matrices and p is the optimum lag number. In our unrestricted VAR model, the vector of endogenous variables (both variables are in real growth rates) is as follows:
We try two different Cholesky orderings of variables. In one ordering, military spending has an immediate impact on income but affect itself with lags. As impulse response may be sensitive to the order of variable, for robustness test we also use Generalized Impulse
Response introduced by Pesaran and Shin (1998) .
The vector of exogenous variables is as follows:
where w1 controls special situation under the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) .
Results
Our empirical analysis includes three steps: Frist we do a Granger causality investigation between income per capita growth and military spending (as a share of total spending as well as per capita) growth following an estimation of VAR model. Second, we implement an impulse response function analysis to examine the dynamic responses of income growth to shocks in military budget and vice versa. Third, we carry out a variance decomposition analysis to understand the relative importance of military spending (income growth) for the explanation of volatility in income growth (military spending).
In order to examine the Granger causality between military spending and income growth, we need to use the stationary variables (Malizard, 2010) . Therefore, as a first step we carry out the unit root tests: ADF test (Dicky and Fuller, 1979) and PP test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) .
The unit root tests results are presented in Table 1 . The ADF and PP tests results show that our variables are stationary and a VAR model can be used to examine the causality. To estimate a VAR model we need to find an optimum lag length. 
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There are some statistical criteria which help us to find the optimal lag length. These information criteria are LR (sequential modified likelihood ratio), FPE (final prediction error), and AIC (Akaike information criterion). Table 2 shows the optimum lag for [real GDP per capita growth rate, real military spending share growth rate]. The optimum lag length is 3. 
Granger causality test
Using the optimum number of lag length (3), we proceed to investigate the Granger causality test. Military spending budget growth may be said to cause real GDP per capita growth if and only if the expectation of real GDP per capita growth given the history of military spending budget growth is different from the unconditional expectation of real GDP per capita growth:
For 3 optimum numbers of lags, we model:
Now, we investigate whether adding similar information about military spending budget growth rate (MIL) will improve our ability to predict real GDP per capita growth (INCOME):
If the λ's are jointly significant then we have established cause. The similar test can be used to examine the causality of income growth for the military spending. show the military burden for the whole economy. We estimated a VAR model using this third indicator of military burden, finding an optimum lag length of 4 on the basis of FPE and AIC criteria. Then we controlled for the diagnostics statistics such as stability of VAR model, residual normality and residual autocorrelation which turn out to be satisfactory. Finally, we proceed for the Granger causality test. As we can see from Table 3 , the results do not change using this proxy of military burden. There is strong evidence that the military spending (% of GDP) growth rates Granger causes economic growth but not vice versa. Lütkepohl, 1991) . The estimated VAR is stable (stationary) if all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. If the VAR is not stable, certain results (such as impulse response standard errors) are not valid (QMS, 2010) . Figure 2 shows that no roots of characteristic polynomial lie outside of the circle and our estimated VAR model satisfies the stability conditions.
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Figure 2. Stability of VAR model
We have also examined whether the residuals of our estimated VAR model are multivariate normal. It compares the 3rd and 4th moments (skewness and kurtosis) to those from a normal distribution. To do this test, we need to specify a factorization of the residuals. We use inverse square root of residual correlation matrix (Doornik and Hansen, 2008) which is invariant to the ordering and to the scale of the variables in the VAR. The results show that the residuals of estimated VAR are multivariate normal (Joint p-value: 0.28). Finally, VAR residual serial correlation LM test shows that up to 12 lags we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Considering these diagnostic results we can safely continue our analysis for the impulse response function and variance decomposition. 14
Impulse Response Functions (IRF)
The impulse response functions trace out the response of current and future values of the Iranian military spending (economic growth) to a one standard deviation increase in the current value of economic growth (military spending). Runkle (1987) emphasizes the construction and report of confidence bands around the impulse responses in the VAR models. Following Sims and Zha (1999) , we use 68% confidence intervals (one standard 14 We checked also these diagnostic indicators for the models with the per capita of military spending instead of share in total spending. We notice satisfactory performance in all criteria. From Figure 3 we notice that the response of economic growth to a one standard deviation increase in the share of military spending growth is positive and increases over the first 3 years after initial shock. It reaches its maximum in the 3 rd year, falling afterwards. This response of real GDP per capita growth is also statistically significant. Figure 3 shows that military spending can foster and drive economic growth in Iran for the short and middle run.
Therefore, a negative shock in the military budget through energy sanction can lead to economic stagnation, at least in the short and middle run. These results also support the Keynesian theory in which the government increases aggregated demand through military and security related spending. Figure 4 shows the response of military budget to a shock in economic growth. There is no immediate effect. The response of military budget to an increasing shock in economic growth 18/27 is also increasing for the first three years after shock but is not statistically significant for the first 2 years following initial shock. This response is only statistically significant in the 3 rd year after shock. When comparing Figures 3 and 4 , we notice that the shocks to military budget are more detrimental in a term of statistical significance for current and future GDP per capita growth rate.
In order to complete the results obtained from the Granger causality and IRFs, we proceed with the variance decomposition analysis (VDA).
Variance decomposition analysis
What is the relative importance of military spending growth rate shocks in changes economic growth rates and vice versa? To reply this question, we apply the variance decomposition analysis. It provides the proportion of movement in a specific variable in connection with its own shock against the shocks to other variable. The higher the share of explanation of error variance, the more important that variable is for the other variable in the system. For calculating VDA, we follow the Cholesky ordering which was presented in section 5.2 for IRFs analysis. Table 4 presents the variance decomposition analysis results for 20 years after the initial shock. We can see that military spending growth rate has a stronger role to explain the volatility of the Iranian economic growth in the short and middle run. By contrast, the variance of forecast error of military spending is mainly due to its own innovations and the role of economic growth to explain the volatility of military budget is marginal. This is in line with our Granger causality and IRFs findings. In the long run about 20% of the variance forecast error of the Iranian economic growth can be explained by the innovations in the military budget growth rate. 
Respons
Using per capita military spending
As an alternative specification, we use the per capita of government military spending growth rate instead of its growth rate of relative share in budget in our impulse response analysis.
How innovations in real per capita spending on military growth rates affect the real per capita GDP growth rates? The Granger causality testing using this per capita specification of military spending is presented in In order to avoid the difficulties of identifying orthogonal shocks in VAR models, Pesaran and Shin (1998) introduced Generalized Impulse Responses (GIR). The GIR is not sensitive to the ordering of variables in the VAR model. Another robustness check is estimating 2 standard deviation error bands (95% confidence intervals) instead of 1 standard deviation error bands suggested by Sims and Zha (1999) .
As we can see from Figures 5 the Iranian GDP per capita growth shows the statistically significant (at 95% confidence intervals) response to an increasing shock to the military spending per capita growth during the 2 nd and 3 rd years after initial shock. Although the response of military spending per capita growth to a shock in economic growth is positive, as is shown in Figure 6 , but this response is not statistically significant at 95% confidence intervals. This robustness test again shows the sensitivity of the overall economic performance of Iran to unexpected shocks in the military budget. We also re-estimate variance decomposition from VAR model using per capita specification of military spending growth. 
Conclusion and policy implications
This study examines the dynamic interactions between the economic growth and military spending of the Iranian governemnt. Current studies such as Farzanegan (2011) show that negative oil revenue shocks due to increasing sanction on the Iranian energy industry and crude oil sales have a significant effect on the Iranian military and security expenditures. We investigate whether such shocks on the Iranian military budget is also relevant for the Iranian economic growth. We employ the Vector Auto Regressive models (VAR), Garnger causality, impulse response functions and variance decompsoition tools to trace the effects of shocks on the macroeconomy performance of Iran. The period of analysis is the past 49 years from 1959 to 2007. Our results show that past information on the military spending (as a share of total spending or in per capita) growth rates are useful to explain the future developments of economic growth in Iran. There is a statistically significant unidirectional causality from 24/27 military spending to economic growth. Our additional analyses through IRFs and VDA also highlight the importance of military budget shocks in explaining volatility in the Iranian economic growth in future. There are strong forward and backward linkages between the Iranian military industry and overal output of the economy. Strong presense of the military forces such as the the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)' affiliated firms in the Iranian economy may explain some parts of this significant effect. The IRFs results show that response of economic growth to a one standard deviation increasing shock in the military spending is positive and statistically significant for the short and middle run.
The policy implications of these results are straightforward. Those sanctions aiming to restrict the Iranian government's oil export capacities and consequently military budget may affect the overal performance of the Iranian economy significantly. However, if the sanctions do not target the financial sources of military budget (i.e., oil rents) and deal with political targets or economic transactions which increases transaction costs of trade and shocks to the economic output may not have a significant effect on the military budget.
